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OLD VS. OLDER: CREATING A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ADEA IN CLINE V. GENERAL
DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit decided Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.1
and established an important precedent for opening the door to
reverse age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (ADEA).2 The court reversed the lower court's
decision, which granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff-employees' age discrimination claim. In so doing, the Sixth
Circuit held that younger workers between the ages of forty and
forty-nine, who are within the ADEA's protection, are entitled to
bring a cause of action under the ADEA and claim that they have
been treated with disfavor when compared to older workers.
The court held that, in determining legislative intent, the
ADEA's plain and unambiguous language (providing such young
members of the protected class with a cause of action) trumps its
legislative history (which places emphasis on protecting "older
workers"). The court declined to follow previous decisions in the
First3 and Seventh4 Circuits, which denied a cause of action to
plaintiffs alleging reverse age discrimination under the ADEA.
Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment." 5 The ADEA particularly shields individuals
1. 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2002).
3. See Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
4. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
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forty years of age or older from experiencing discrimination in
employment.6  However, because the statute mentions "older
persons," 7 rather than "individuals who are at least 40 years of age,",
8
in its "Congressional statement of findings and purpose," 9 many
courts have assumed that individuals between the ages of forty and
forty-nine do not receive the same protection under the ADEA as do
individuals fifty years of age and older. As a result of this emphasis
on "older persons," and the underinclusion of the protected class of
individuals between the ages of forty and forty-nine, there is a split
in opinion between the First and Seventh Circuits (which hold that
the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for reverse age
discrimination) and the Sixth Circuit (which holds in Cline that it
does).10
This Case Comment first provides a summary of the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Cline. Second, it provides a summary of the
contrary decisions of other circuits. Third, this Comment agrees that
in holding that employees aged between forty and forty-nine have a
cause of action under the ADEA, the Sixth Circuit provides the
correct level of protection to younger workers because it reflects the
true legislative intent in enacting the ADEA-that is, preventing
employment age discrimination experienced by all individuals forty
and older, not just those above fifty. Fourth, this Comment explores
the impact of this decision on employee pension plans across the
United States. Finally, this Comment concludes that by creating
ADEA liability for employers who prefer older workers, the Sixth
Circuit provides the better approach in interpreting the ADEA
because it sufficiently promotes the elimination of employment age
discrimination.
6. See id. § 631 (a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.").
7. Id. § 621(b).
8. Id. § 63 1(a).
9. Id. § 621.
10. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
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II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF CLINE v. GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND
SYSTEMS, INC.
A. The ADEA and Reverse Discrimination
at General Dynamics
The ADEA does not permit an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age .... ,,11
The ADEA also forbids an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would... otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
ae ,,12age ......
Based on these prohibitions of the ADEA, Dennis Cline and 195
other employees between the ages of forty and forty-nine sued their
employer, General Dynamics. They alleged that, after they entered
into a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with their labor
union, the United Auto Workers (UAW) on July 1, 1997, General
Dynamics discriminated against them based on their age in obtaining
retirement health benefits.'
3
The first collective bargaining agreement (CBA1), which was in
effect prior to July 1, 1997, provided all General Dynamics
employees who had obtained thirty years of seniority in the company
with full health benefits once they retired.' 4 The new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA2) no longer provided full health benefits
to all General Dynamics retirees with thirty years of seniority. 15 It
only provided full health benefits to employees who were fifty years
or older on July 1, 1997.16
In response to CBA2, Cline and the other 195 employees of
General Dynamics, who were denied health benefits to which they
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002).
12. Id. § 623(a)(2).
13. See Cline, 296 F.3d 466 at 467-68; see also Workers in Their 40s Can
Sue Employer for Favoring Over-50 Workers, EMPLOYMENT LAW REPORT,
Sept. 2002, at 1 (summarizing the facts and outcome of the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Cline).
14. See Cline, 296 F.3d at 468.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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were previously entitled under CBA1, "sought, and obtained, a
determination from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
that the CBA2 adversely affected General Dynamics employees who
were between the ages of 40 and 49 on July 1, 1997."' 7 The
plaintiffs then filed suit under the ADEA alleging that the CBA2
discriminated against them in their employment based on age.18
The plaintiffs who were affected by the CBA2 divided into three
subcategories. The first, called the "Cline group," consisted of 183
present employees of the company who were not qualified for health
benefits upon retirement under the CBA2, but were qualified under
CBA1.19 The second, called the "Babb group," consisted of ten
General Dynamics employees who retired before the CBA2 came
into effect in order to safeguard their health benefits under the
CBA1 .20 Finally, the third, called the "Diaz group," included three
workers who did not receive the continuous benefits they would have
received under CBA1 because they retired after CBA2 came into
effect on July 1, 1997.21 Together, as a class, these plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, costs, and fees under the
provisions of the ADEA.22
B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
In response to the plaintiffs' age discrimination claim, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the District Court of Ohio in
March of 2000. The defendant argued that the alleged age
discrimination favoring workers age fifty and over did not infringe
any federal or state anti-discrimination statutes.23 The district court
granted the defendant's motion, stating that the plaintiffs' claim
lacked merit because "a claim of reverse age discrimination is not
cognizable under [the] ADEA. 24
The court confirmed that the ADEA generally forbids employee
age discrimination.25 Notably, the court acknowledged that the new
17. Id.
18. See Cline, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
19. See id. at 847.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 848.
25. See id.
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CBA facially discriminated by forming two categories of workers:
(1) those ages fifty and older, entitled to health benefits upon
retirement, and (2) those under fifty, who were no longer entitled to
those same benefits.26  Despite this finding of facial age
discrimination, the court still dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.27 The
court framed the issue as whether the ADEA provided a cause of
action for this alleged type of reverse discrimination where older
employees are treated more favorably than younger employees.28
In support of its dismissal, the court gave two main reasons why
the plaintiffs did not make out a recognizable claim. First, the fact
that the younger workers were entitled to the health benefits under
the CBA1 was irrelevant in deciding whether the CBA2 violated the
ADEA.29 The court reasoned that because the health benefits are
welfare benefits "not subject to statutory vesting requirements" of
the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA), it would
have been acceptable under ERISA for General Dynamics and the
employees' union to take away the health benefits of all the
employees under the CBA2.3 °
Second, the court held that the plaintiffs could not make out a
claim because no other federal court that previously heard the issue
had provided for a reverse age discrimination cause of action under
the ADEA.31 The court reasoned that the absence of any case in
support of the plaintiffs' position was a result of Congress's purpose
in enacting the ADEA, which was to protect "older workers" who
faced discrimination in employment, "not workers who suffer
discrimination because they are too young. 3 2  Thus, for the
aforementioned reasons, the district court dismissed the claim. The
plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. (citing Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp.-Delco Chassis Div., 941 F.
Supp. 284, 287 (D. Conn. 1996); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140-
41 (D. Me. 1995); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
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III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS AND DECISION
A. The Circuit's Opinion
The court's analysis can be summarized as follows: "[T]he
language of the statute itself' 33 determines "how a statute is to be
applied, 34 and therefore "the protected class should be protected. 35
In reversing the district court's holding-thereby providing members
of the protected class who are forty years of age and older with a
cause of action-the court emphasized that the ADEA's clear and
unambiguous language should control its interpretation and properly
resolve the case. 6 The issue was whether the ADEA afforded a
claim to employees "within the protected class who claim that their
employer discriminated against them on the basis of age because of
the employer's more favorable treatment of older employees, also
within the class."37
The court began its analysis by describing the predominantly
accepted method of statutory application. It stated that the statute's
basic words principally reveal the legislature's intent. 38 Especially
where the statute contains simple and clear language, the court stated
that there is no reason to look at the legislative history in determining
Congress's intent in writing the law.39 More importantly, if a court
believes that the language of a statute does not accurately portray
what it thinks the lawmaker "must have" meant, it cannot fix the
perceived insufficiency by holding that "the legislators intended
something other than what they declared. ' 4°
The court highlighted the language of section 623(a)(1) of the
ADEA, which reads: "It shall be unlawful for an employer... to...
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of...
age . . . ."4 The court then stated that the statute visibly forbids
33. United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1994); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
34. Cline, 296 F.3d at 468-69.
35. Id. at 471.
36. See id. at 469.
37. Id. at 467.
38. See id. at 469.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002).
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employers from discriminating against "any individual" based on age
alone. Furthermore, the court pointed out that according to section
631 (a), "any individual" means "individuals who are at least 40 years
of age. ' 43 Thus, the court concluded that, according to its plain
words, the ADEA prohibited employers from discriminating against
any of their employees, who were forty years of age and older, based
on age.
an
Next, the court explained that it believed the district court was
wrong by reading the statute to prohibit age discrimination only
against those of the protected class who are "older," meaning those
employees at least forty years old and also "relatively older than any
other group of employees with whom they are compared. 4 5 The
court also disagreed with the lower court's holding because it did not
fimd its analysis persuasive and did not agree with the majority of
previous decisions which "have held that the ADEA does not provide
a cause of action for 'reverse discrimination.'"
6
The Sixth Circuit gave four reasons to support its decision to
ignore previous interpretations of the ADEA, particularly that of
Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc.47  First, the court stated that the
Hamilton decision gave too much weight to the "generalized
language of Congress's Statement of Findings and Purpose in the
ADEA.' '48 Second, Hamilton overlooked and overturned the well-
known rule of statutory interpretation that the express and exact
words of a statute, and not its generalized words, govern.49
42. Cline, 296 F.3d at 469 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 469 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2002)).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 470 (quoting Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228
(7th Cir. 1992) and citing Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 278 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.); Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318
(7th Cir. 1988); Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp.-Delco Chassis Div., 941 F.
Supp. 284, 287 (D. Conn. 1996), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Dittman v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. 96-9442, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 14980, at *1 (2d Cir.
June 20, 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D. Me. 1995)
(additional citations omitted)).
47. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
48. Cline, 296 F.3d at 470.
49. See id. (citing Metro. Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States,
634 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 1980)).
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Quoting the language of sections 621(a) and 621(b) of the
ADEA, the court agreed that Congress aimed to safeguard "older
workers., 50 However, holding that the ADEA provides a cause of
action for "any individual" who is at least forty years old is
consistent with the legislature's intention to guard "older workers"
from employment discrimination on the basis of age.51 The court
reconciled section 621, which expresses the legislative intent to
protect older workers, with section 623 and section 631, in which
Congress acknowledges an older worker as "any individual" who is
forty years of age and older.5 2 In sum, the court concluded that
"§ 623(a)(1) and § 631(a), taken together, prohibit an employer from
discriminating against 'any individual' 40 years of age or older based
on that person's age.",
53
Third, the court stated that it did not accept this particular case
to be one of "reverse discrimination., 54 It stated that the district
court and other circuits were wrong to hold that the "ADEA does not
provide a cause of action for 'reverse discrimination."' 55 Therefore,
"otherwise prohibited discrimination is permitted if the victims are
literally (statutorily) within the protected class, but are a group
within the class who in most cases are the beneficiaries of
discrimination against others., 56 The court stressed that the plaintiffs
did not experience reverse discrimination, but rather "age
discrimination." 57 Because all the plaintiffs fell within the protected
class of the ADEA, all of them were entitled to make allegations that
they suffered discrimination in obtaining benefits because of their
age.58
Finally, the court observed that courts that followed the
Hamilton decision went against the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) understanding of the ADEA, which the court
believed to be an accurate reading of the statute's language.59 The
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 471.
53. Id. at 470.
54. Id. at 471.
55. Id. at 470.
56. Id. at 471.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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EEOC states, "It is unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate in
hiring or in any other way by giving preference because of age
between individuals 40 and over."60  For example, the EEOC
prohibits an employer from turning down either of two applicants
applying for the same job, one forty-two and the other fifty-two,
because of their age.6'
In its conclusion the court underscored that, though the facts of
this case are atypical of the usual ADEA claim "in that the plaintiffs
were younger than the employees who were to receive health
benefits upon retirement under the CBA2," that did not invalidate
application of the statute that bans age discrimination upon "any
individual" who is forty years of age and older.62 If the legislature
only wanted to protect those employees comparatively older than the
rest, it could have done so. 63 Furthermore, the court dismissed all
policy justifications to the contrary by emphasizing both that the
court is bound by the statute's plain text and that the court has no
reason to look beyond the statute, where its language is
unambiguous, as it is here.
64
B. Judge Cole's Concurrence
While joining Judge Ryan's opinion based on the unambiguous
language of the ADEA, Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr. wrote separately to
express his thoughts as to whether Congress particularly expected the
ADEA to provide a cause of action for reverse discrimination. 65 In
emphasizing three main points, Judge Cole concluded that although
Congress was primarily concerned with preventing the type of age
discrimination that prefers younger over older workers, "Congress's
choice of language.., intended or not, also prohibits age
discrimination that favors older over younger protected
employees."66
First, Judge Cole noted that, read together, section 623 and
section 631 clearly ban any discrimination based on age against
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2002).
61. See id.
62. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. (Cole, J., concurring).
66. Id.
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employees who are forty years old and older.67 For example, section
623 outlaws discrimination by an employer against "any individual"
because of age,68 and section 631 confines that discrimination to
employees who are at least forty years old.69 Thus, Judge Cole
reaffirmed that "the text of the ADEA compels the conclusion that
members in the protected class can sue for age discrimination that
favors older over younger workers. 7 °
Second, Judge Cole reaffirmed the majority's conclusion that
there is no reason to go beyond the plain language of the ADEA
because of the well-established law of the Sixth Circuit. In
construing a statute, a court should look beyond the statute's text
only if (1) its wording is vague; (2) there are inconsistencies with the
other provisions of the statute; (3) a textual reading conflicts with the
legislature's objective; or (4) the simple understanding of the statute
leads to ridiculous outcomes.
7 1
Judge Cole declared that none of those situations was applicable
in this specific case.72 First, the words of section 623 and section
631 are not vague because they clearly propose that age
discrimination is wrong and employees who are forty years old and
over may sue if their employer discriminates against them.73 Second,
Judge Cole stated that there is consistency among the provisions of
the ADEA because the reference to "older workers" in section 621 (a)
can also consistently refer to employees over the age of forty.
74
Furthermore, section 623(l)(1)(A), which "allows an employer
to set a minimum age as a condition for eligibility in a pension plan,"
only has significance if section 623 and section 631 allow reverse
age discrimination claims." If younger workers in the protected
class did not have a cause of action for reverse age discrimination for
67. See id. at 472.
68. Id. at 473 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2002)).
69. See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a)).
70. Id. at 472-73.
71. See id. at 473 (citing Ltd., Inc. v. Comm'n, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir.
2002); Vergos v. Gregg's Enters., Inc. 159 F.3d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1998);
Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 1995)
("Resort to legislative history is not appropriate, however, if the text of the
statute may be read unambiguously and reasonably.")).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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the preferable treatment of older workers, "then the minimum age
exception in § 623 (1)(1)(A) would not be necessary (because only
younger employees could sue based on a minimum retirement
age)."76 Third, according to Cole, there is no need to look beyond
the ADEA's text because interpreting the statute as providing a cause
of action for reverse discrimination claims is consistent with the
legislature's statutory intent, which is to prevent employment
decisions based solely on age.
77
Finally, Judge Cole articulated that the court should only focus
on the ADEA's actual text because providing a cause of action for
reverse discrimination to the plaintiffs, who are all within the
statute's protected class, is not ridiculous. 78  Because Congress
determined that all types of age discrimination encumber commerce,
providing a claim for reverse age discrimination can lessen this
congressionally perceived strain on commerce. 79 Similarly, Cole
dismissed the idea that allowing reverse age discrimination suits will
open the door to claims against every retirement plan in the
country,80 because courts have already started to read state laws as
permitting reverse discrimination suits.
81
Third, Judge Cole concurred separately to reconcile the decision
with that of the U.S. Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Consolidated
76. Id.
77. See id. at 473-74.
78. See id. at 474.
79. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (2002) (stating that Congress finds that
"[T]he existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination
in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods
in commerce.").
80. See Cline, 296 F.3d at 474 (Cole, J., concurring) (citing Hamilton v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992)).
81. See id. at 474; Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Servs. Corp., 612 N.W.2d
845 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the Michigan Civil Rights Act
"protects workers who are discriminated against on the basis of their youth"),
appeal denied, 618 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Bergen Comm. Bank
v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999) (7-0 decision) (concluding that New
Jersey's Law Against Discrimination was broad enough to accommodate
plaintiff's claim of age discrimination based on youth); Ogden v. Bureau of
Labor, 699 P.2d 189 (Or. 1985) (en banc) (interpreting Oregon age
discrimination law as allowing claims by younger workers); see also Graffam
v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 405 n.27 (D. Me. 1994) (noting that the
Maine Human Rights Act does not limit age discrimination claims to a certain
range of ages).
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Coin Caterers Corp. 82 Cole argued that O'Connor instructed that in
order "to indirectly prove age discrimination, an ADEA plaintiff
must demonstrate age discrimination that favors a substantially
younger person. 83  Cole noted that, although Cline is a direct
discrimination case and therefore does not depend on the O'Connor
prima facie test, the "substantially younger requirement" implies that
the ADEA does not provide for reverse discrimination claims. The
reason for this is that younger employees who are discriminated
against in favor of older employees cannot demonstrate that
"substantially younger persons were favored., 84
Despite that inference, Cole asserted that the Supreme Court
would agree with the opinion in Cline for three reasons.8 5 First,
O'Connor did not directly address the reverse age discrimination
issue.86 Second, O'Connor recognized that workers within the
protected class of the ADEA could sue each other.87 Finally, the
Supreme Court in O'Connor similarly looked at the plain language
of the statute in interpreting the ADEA. 8
Judge Cole took the position that had the O'Connor Court also
decided the reverse discrimination issue, it would have required
proof of "substantial difference in age," rather than the "substantially
younger" requirement, as the fourth part of its test.89  Cole also
highlighted that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit requires
evidence of "substantial difference in age, not substantially younger
proof."90  Cole concluded that the clear language of the ADEA
permits claims for reverse age discrimination, and this result does not
violate Supreme Court precedent.
9'
82. 517 U.S. 308 (1996) (deciding whether a fifty-six-year-old worker
replaced by a forty-year-old worker satisfied the fourth element of the prima
facie case, even though both employees belonged to the protected class); see
Cline, 296 F.3d at 475 (Cole, J., concurring).
83. Cline, 296 F.3d at 475 (Cole, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 475-76.
91. See id. at 476.
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C. Judge Williams' Dissent
Judge Glen M. Williams offered four reasons for his dissent.
First, no American court has acknowledged a claim for reverse age
discrimination.92 Second, Williams was persuaded by the decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hamilton, which
held that the ADEA does not "protect the young as well as the old,"
because discrimination based on age cannot be reversed.93 Third, the
ADEA's references to "older workers" displays the legislature's
intent to prevent discrimination against only older employees.
94
Finally, the majority's opinion could potentially have a horrible
impact on collective bargaining agreements by questioning the
"validity of seniority and early retirement programs... across the
country." The majority's opinion may thus harm "bargaining for all
workers, regardless of age. 95  Thus, for these four mentioned
reasons, Williams agreed with the district court's decision to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claim.
96
IV. THE FIRST AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDINGS
The sixth circuit's decision in Cline diverges from most other
circuits' interpretation of the ADEA. Unlike Cline, the First,
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that the ADEA does not
provide a cause of action for reverse age discrimination in
employment.
A. Seventh Circuit's Holding in Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc.
In Hamilton, the plaintiffs, who were forty years of age and
older, were denied early retirement benefits because they were too
young when their jobs were terminated.97 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA does not provide a cause of
action for reverse age discrimination.98 In support of its decision, the
court stated that "the ADEA 'does not protect the young as well as
92. See id. at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir.
1992)).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 476.
97. See Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.
98. See id. at 1228.
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the old, or even... the younger against the older."' 99 By looking at
the ADEA's legislative history and its statement of purpose (which
mentions the problems encountered by "older workers"), the court
concluded that there is no proof that the legislature intended to
protect younger employees who are discriminated against based on
age. 100  Furthermore, the court refused to recognize reverse
discrimination claims to prevent a multiplicity of suits against "every
retirement plan because Congress chose more graceful language" in
its statute than was necessary.'
0 1
B. Other Circuits'Positions on Reverse Discrimination
The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits agree with the Seventh
Circuit that the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for reverse
age discrimination. For example, although the First Circuit, in
Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.,102 did not specifically address the issue, it
stated in dicta that the ADEA "does not forbid treating older persons
more generously than others."'1 3 Furthermore, in Stone v. Travelers
Corp.,'0 4 the Ninth Circuit commented that the ADEA does not ban
more favorable treatment of older workers, as opposed to younger
workers.'0 5 Similarly, in Dittman v. General Motors Corp., °6 the
Second Circuit stated that because the ADEA allows minimum age
conditions for retirement benefits, 10 7 the plaintiff employees could
not successfully allege that the plan in question, which denied them
benefits but provided them to employees over the age of fifty,
violated the discrimination act.
08
99. Id. at 1227 (quoting Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314,
318 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original)).
100. See id. at 1228.
101. Id. (citing Karlen, 837 F.2d at 318).
102. 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 278 (emphasis in original).
104. 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995).
105. See id. at 437.
106. No. 96-9442, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 14980, at *1 (2d Cir. June 20,
1997).
107. See id. at *4; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(1)(1)(A) (2002) (allowing the
setting of a minimum age as a condition of eligibility for retirement benefits).
108. See Dittman, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 14980, at *4.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
The Sixth Circuit, in Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems,
Inc., was the first circuit to provide a reverse discrimination cause of
action for plaintiffs within the protected class of the ADEA who sue
their employers for treating older employees within the protected
class better than them. Interestingly, until Cline, circuit courts took
the position that the ADEA's purpose was to protect the oldest
workers and not all workers forty and older, even though the ADEA
specifically mentions that it protects all workers forty and older. 10 9
As such, the circuit courts that previously addressed this issue
excluded the possibility of a reverse discrimination cause of action,
mainly because they misunderstood the purpose of the ADEA.110
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, correctly held that
plaintiffs who are forty to forty-nine years old have a cause of action
for reverse discrimination for three main reasons. First, a literal
reading of the statute strongly supports the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of the ADEA. Second, other sections of the ADEA,
namely section 623(i) and section 623(/)(1)(A), which the Cline
majority decision did not mention, also support this conclusion.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the holding, which is consistent
with the principal purposes of the ADEA, correctly facilitates the
elimination of age discrimination faced by employees in the
workplace.
A. The Court Correctly Held that a Literal Reading
Controls the ADEA 's Interpretation
In creating a cause of action for reverse discrimination, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly conducted a literal
reading of the ADEA, rather than resorting to legislative history,
which is what previous circuits, such as the Seventh Circuit in
Hamilton,'11 have done. When a court interprets a statute, it is
established that "the language of the statute" itself controls.' 12 It is
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
110. For a summary of other circuits' holdings, see text accompanying notes
93-96.
111. See text accompanying notes 95-99.
112. United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1988).
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appropriate to go beyond the wording of the statute only when it is
ambiguous or unclear.' 
13
For example, in Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services,
Inc. v. United States, the Sixth Circuit resorted to legislative history
where there was a question as to whether section 501(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code included laundry services as a type of
hospital cooperative service entitled to a tax exemption under section
501 (c)(3). 1  In order to resolve the perceived ambiguity, the court
specifically looked to the statements of congressional leaders made
at a conference committee regarding the statute." 5  The court
determined that the statute was ambiguous as concerning the status
of laundry services, because nowhere did it explicitly state that those
services were included. 16 Furthermore, the court read the plain
language of the statute to mean that the list of qualifying tax-exempt
hospital cooperatives mentioned in section 501(e) was a "definitive
inventory rather than merely a descriptive list.""
117
Unlike section 501(e), the ADEA is not ambiguous. Section
623(a)(1) simply reads that an employer may not discriminate
against "any individual" in regards to his or her employment based
on age."18 Furthermore, section 631(a) defines "any individual" as
"individuals... at least 40 years of age." 119  Thus, unlike
Metropolitan, where the statute at issue made no mention of the
status of the disputed item, the ADEA clearly mentions both the
actions employers are prevented from taking and who is protected
from such proscribed actions. Contrary to Metropolitan, there is no
need to resort to the legislative history, because the statute itself
already addresses and resolves the issue at hand.
Furthermore, "[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions from [the legislative history] would justify a limitation on
113. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999)
(stating that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, we must begin with its plain
language, and may resort to a review of congressional intent or legislative
history only when the language of the statute is not clear.").
114. See Metro. Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d
330, 333-34 (6th Cir. 1980).
115. Seeid. at334.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002).
119. Id. § 631(a).
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the 'plain meaning' of the statutory language."'12  In Cline, the
defendants did not show that the legislative history of the ADEA
demonstrated an "extraordinary showing of contrary intentions."'
1 21
In fact, the legislative history of the ADEA appears consistent with
the plain meaning of the statutory language. Thus, the legislative
history of the ADEA also appears consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation.
Even though the legislative history places emphasis on
protecting "older workers," it does not specifically point out that the
protected older workers are only those who are more than fifty years
old. For example, the statute's "statement of findings and purpose"
states that Congress finds that because "older workers" face
disadvantages in retaining and regaining employment, the statute's
purpose is "to promote employment of older persons ....,.122
However, nowhere does the statute specifically define "older
workers" as those only over the age of forty-nine. In fact, a closer
look into the ADEA's legislative history reveals that it remains
completely consistent with its plain language which protects all
employees forty and older. For example, the "Interpretive Notes and
Decisions," in section 621 states that the ADEA "was intended to
alleviate serious economic and psychological suffering of people
between the ages of 40 and 65 caused by widespread job
discrimination against them... [and] to prevent persons aged 40 to
65 from having their careers cut off by unreasonable prejudice.'
2 3
Thus, the legislative history provides no compelling reason to
disregard or limit the force of the plain language of the statute. In
fact, the legislative history actually supports the Sixth Circuit's
holding that the ADEA protects all employees over forty years of
age, and thus provides employees who are forty to forty-nine years
old with a reverse age discrimination cause of action.
120. Johnson, 855 F.2d at 305 (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
75 (1984)).
121. Id. at 306; see Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 466, 472 (6th
Cir. 2002).
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 621 annot. 1, para. 3.
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B. Sections 623(1) and (1) Also Support the Court's Decision in
Creating a Reverse Discrimination Cause ofAction
for Employees Denied Benefits Because of Age
Consistent with the court's literal reading of section 623(a) and
section 631 (a) of the ADEA, the plain wording of section 623(i) also
prohibits an employer from practicing age discrimination against any
employee who is forty years of age and older, specifically in the
establishment or maintenance of employee pension benefit plans.
124
In pertinent part, section 623(i)(1)(A) prohibits an employer from
establishing or maintaining "an employee pension benefit plan which
requires or permits... the cessation of an employee's benefit
accrual, or the reduction of the rate of an employee's benefit accrual
because of age."'125 Thus, read in conjunction with section 631,
which defines "individuals" as those forty and over, the plain
language of section 623(i) can also be read to forbid an employer
from sustaining a pension plan that discriminates against any
employee over thirty-nine solely because of age.
In Cline, the new CBA at issue provided that "only employees
50 years of age or older on July 1, 1997, remained eligible to receive
full health benefits upon retirement."'126 Thus, the plaintiffs aged
forty to forty-nine who were previously eligible were automatically
denied these benefits simply because of their age. 127 This violated
section 623(i), which prohibits the termination of an employee
benefit plan solely because of an employee's age. 1
28
Although section 623(7)(1)(A) of the ADEA states that an
employee pension benefit plan may contain a "minimum age" for
eligibility, it specifies that such a minimum age requirement will
"not be a violation of [only] subsection[s] (a), (b), (c), or (e)."'1 29 It
makes no mention that such a minimum age requirement might or
might not be a violation of subsection (i). "A statute should be read
and construed as a whole and, if possible, given a harmonious,
124. See id. § 623(i).
125. Id.
126. Cline, 296 F.3d at 468.
127. See id.
128. See 29 U.S.C § 623(i).
129. Id. § 623(l)(2)(A).
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comprehensive meaning." 130  Thus, because section 623(/)(1)(A)
does not specifically contend that a "minimum age" requirement is or
is not a violation of section 623(i), which prevents any age
discrimination in employment pensions, it is possible to read that
such a minimum age requirement may be a violation of section
623(i). Even if section 623(i) might appear to conflict with section
623(/)(1)(A), a "harmonious [and] comprehensive" reading of all
sections of the ADEA, namely section 623(i), section 623(7)(1)(A),
and section 631 (a), eliminates any ambiguity and produces a clear
rule that is understandable on its face. 131
Additionally, as Judge Cole correctly stated in his concurrence,
the "minimum age" exception in section 623(7)(1)(A) only makes
sense if the ADEA is read to allow reverse discrimination suits.
1 32
Because only younger employees would protest a minimum age
provision in an employee pension plan, the "minimum age"
exception demonstrates that Congress, by the plain language of the
ADEA, allowed for a reverse age discrimination cause of action.
133
Thus, not only is section 623(/)(1)(A) reconcilable with the rest of
the ADEA, but it also demonstrates that the ADEA provides a
reverse age discrimination cause of action for younger employees
who have been discriminated in favor of the older employees within
the ADEA's protected class.
C. The Sixth Circuit's Holding Correctly Facilitates the
Eradication of Employment Age Discrimination
As opposed to other circuits, which have all denied a plaintiffs
reverse age discrimination cause of action, the Sixth Circuit's
decision to interpret the ADEA as allowing plaintiffs a reverse
discrimination claim was also correct because it encourages the
promotion of the main purpose of the statute-the eradication of
discrimination in all aspects of employment because of age. As
130. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir.
1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983).
131. Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (citing Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d at 1174).
132. See id. at 473 (Cole, J., concurring).
133. Cf Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 96-9442, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
14980, at *4 (2d Cir. June 20, 1997) (affirming decision to deny plaintiffs'
reverse age discrimination claim, but refusing to specifically address whether
the ADEA actually allows a claim for reverse age discrimination); see also text
accompanying notes 104-06.
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Congress has found, discrimination against employees because of
age is a great problem that has severe economic and social
consequences. 134  Congress initially enacted the ADEA in 1967
because it found that "[h]undreds of thousands not yet old, not yet
voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age
discrimination." 135 In 1965, the Secretary of Labor reported that
about "half of all private job openings were barred to applicants over
fifty-five; a quarter were closed to applicants over forty-five.
136
Congress determined that, in economic terms, this was a serious and
senseless problem "to a nation on the move."' 137 Additionally, it
found that the bigger loss "is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and
well-being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their
families." Thus, in enacting the ADEA, and limiting it to ages
forty and older, Congress hoped to correct this problem.
However, recent data reveals that this problem has not been
adequately solved, especially with regard to protecting employees
between forty and forty-nine. For example, a statistical analysis of
all claims made under the ADEA in 1996 revealed that there has
been a "very significant rise in the percentage of younger plaintiffs-
an increase of 41% more.., in their forties, and... [a] decline of
18% in the percentage of plaintiffs in their fifties. 139 The study
explained the move "towards younger plaintiffs" as a result of
greater layoff rates "for younger ADEA-protected workers, i.e., those
in their forties and early fifties.' 40 In sum, the study demonstrates
that the need to protect the relatively younger workers exists now
more than ever. Consequently, by providing redress for these
relatively younger workers, the Sixth Circuit facilitates the ADEA's
original intent, which is the elimination of age discrimination of all
employees forty and older.
Additionally, from a policy perspective, a broad interpretation of
the ADEA sustaining claims by younger employees against older
134. See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at
Thirty: Where It's Been, Where It Is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L.
REv. 579, 583 (1997).
135. Id. (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 1089-90 (Jan. 23, 1967)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 603.
140. Id. at 604.
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ones does not upset the objectives of the ADEA. To the contrary, a
liberal reading enhances "the ADEA's purpose of promoting
individuals based on ability alone."'
141
VI. IMPACT
The Sixth Circuit, in Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems,
Inc., creates the appropriate remedy for employees between the ages
of forty and forty-nine who feel that they have experienced age-
based employment discrimination. By interpreting the ADEA to
allow reverse age discrimination claims, the court established
precedent for courts that deal with younger employees who feel that
they have been discriminated against because of their age in the
distribution of employee benefit plans.
However, this decision may have "far-reaching effects"'142 on
employee pension programs and health benefit arrangements that
contain age limitations. There are many "benefit policies in which
the starting age is not 40 but something older than that."'
143
Additionally, many severance plans only accept employees who are
fifty-five years of age and above for early retirement eligibility. 144
Thus, a broad reading of the Sixth Circuit's holding may encourage
lawsuits by many employees between the ages of forty and forty-nine
who are not covered by their employer's benefit plan.
As Judge Williams articulated in his dissent, this may have a
negative impact on all employees over the age of forty.' 45 If
employers are forced to provide benefits to all employees over forty,
or none at all because they might be faced with a reverse
discrimination suit, they might opt not to provide any benefits at all.
Thus, Cline raises the question of whether any employer will be able
to have "early-retirement options that start later than age 40." 146
141. Chad A. Stewart, Comment, Young, Talented, and Fired: The New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the Right Decision in Bergen
Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1689, 1723 (2000).
142. Gillian Flynn, The Maturing of the ADEA, WORKFORCE, Oct. 2002, at
87; see also text accompanying notes 92-96 (stating the dissent's concern with
potential adverse effects of the majority decision).
143. Flynn, supra note 142, at 87.
144. See id.
145. See text accompanying note 95.
146. Flynn, supra note 142, at 87.
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Especially with the increase in cutbacks of medical benefits, the
answer to this question may prove to be important. 1
47
However, a more narrow reading of the Cline decision might
provide answers. Such a reading may lead employers into trouble
only if such employers change or alter existing benefit plans based
solely on age. By demonstrating that they have justifiable business
reasons148 for a change in an existing employee benefit plan,
employers may avoid trouble under the ADEA and insulate
themselves against reverse discrimination claims. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit's decision does not prevent employers from making sound
business judgments or force them to stop all benefits. In fact, a
narrower reading of the decision merely suggests that if employers
alter existing benefit plans, they should not do so solely on age-based
decisions.
Reading the rule to provide that age may merely be one reason
to change benefit plans may provide courts with some guidance in
determining the validity of changes in existing employee benefit
plans. Furthermore, a consideration of a set of factors may prove
useful in assessing the lawfulness of such a change in an employee
benefit plan that takes age into account. For example, courts might
consider: (1) the adverse impact caused by the change in the existing
plan on the age-based class of affected employees; (2) the severity of
this impact on the class; (3) the viability of the employer's business
without making the changes to the existing plan; (4) the availability
of alternative means to preserve the employer's business-if the
viability of the business is at stake; (5) the number of employees
affected; and (6) the terms of similar benefit plans in other similarly-
situated businesses.
In sum, although the decision in Cline may challenge existing
employee plans and affect the ability of employers to alter existing
benefit provisions to address their changing business needs, a narrow
interpretation of the court's holding and the suggested six mentioned
factors necessarily assures both that existing employee benefit
programs remain intact, and that the goals of the ADEA in
preventing age-based discrimination are met.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In holding that the ADEA provides a cause of action for reverse
age discrimination claims, the Sixth Circuit was the first to provide
redress for such aggrieved plaintiffs between the ages of forty and
forty-nine. It is usually thought that the oldest employees experience
the most discrimination and thus deserve the most protection.
However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, as the facts of
Cline demonstrate, younger employees often suffer just as much, if
not more, age-based discrimination.
The ADEA acknowledged this phenomenon when it extended its
protection to all employees over the age of thirty-nine. In
recognizing this concern, which is articulated in the plain language
of the statute, the Sixth Circuit correctly extended the protections of
ADEA to the aggrieved plaintiffs. Although critics have expressed
concerns that the application of Cline may have negative impacts on
existing employee benefit plans, recent developments in the case
further eliminate such concerns.
Interestingly, since the Sixth Circuit's decision, the defendants
in Cline have "already changed their policy. ' 149 This suggests two
things: (1) that employers will find it more beneficial to both
themselves and to their employees if their employer provides equal
treatment to all employees of the protected class, or (2) if the
employer chooses to change an existing plan, the employer will find
it beneficial to ensure that age is not the sole distinguishing factor.
Thus, in creating a reverse age discrimination cause of action, the
Sixth Circuit protects the rights of all employees within the protected
class and adequately furthers the goals of the ADEA in fighting age-
based discrimination in the workplace.
Tamar Buchakjian*
149. See id.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School. I truly thank Tanya,
Geoffrey, and Sharon of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all their
hard work and helpful commentary in publishing this Comment. This second
Comment that I have published this year is dedicated to my parents, John and
Annie Buchakjian, for their never-ending support and love in all my endeavors.
I also owe a special thank you to my grandmother, my sisters Rita and Lena,
and my best friend Apik, for always remaining my number one fans.
Summer 2003] 1649
1650 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 36:1627
